

The New Economic Togetherness: American and Soviet Reactions *

"I ask all of your colleagues,
Mr. President, and mine to
draw closer to us so that we
can all be in this historic
picture together."

*Brezhnev at San Clemente,
June 24, 1973*

Our Hopes: American Reactions ¹

A number of well-known factors have contributed in the early seventies to a sharp and rapid change in American reactions to economic relations with Communist states, particularly the Soviet Union. These states, as a group, have come to be credited with less of an urge to advance, for defensive or offensive purposes, than had been the case before. Their cohesion has evidently weakened or turned into its opposite—mutual enmity. The economic growth rate of the Soviet

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1. A note may be necessary about the style of presentation. Often, when attempting to portray a belief, I express it as if I were advancing it. The context

Union has fallen. The capacity of U.S. or U.S.-induced economic warfare significantly to affect Communist military postures has come to appear limited, both as to our direct impact on our potential opponent and as to our capacity to make our allies follow our lead. Our balance-of-payments difficulties have made us more interested in any partner toward whom there is a chance of developing a surplus, thereby enabling potential exporters to Communist countries to believe and argue that what is good for them is even better for the nation. The energy "crisis" has for the first time made Communist resources appear to be American assets.

But we have not stopped at mere normalization, assimilating economic relations with Communist states to transactions with any other partners. If prior to the early seventies the dominant belief was that trade with Communists isn't just trade, it's bad, a prevailing supposition now is that, while still not just trade, it's good.

Thus, over the past quarter-century we have gone through several phases with respect to our views of business with Communists.

Phase 1 (High cold war): As soon as a transaction would procure economic gain to Communists—and which would not (after all, it's a transaction)?—one should abstain from it.

Phase 2 (Low cold war): If our economic gain would exceed theirs, we may engage in a transaction with them.

Phase 3 (Low détente): Never mind how small our economic gain and how large theirs; as soon as there is political gain from a transaction, it should be undertaken.

Phase 4 (High détente): Never mind how large (up to a limit left undetermined) our economic loss and how large their economic gain; as soon as there is political gain from a transaction—or avoidance of political loss, which might be substantial—it should be undertaken.

Phase 5 (Normalcy achieved): Never mind our or their political gain, or their economic gain; as soon as there is economic gain for us we should do it. And the greater their economic gain, the greater the future political gain for us.

As to the impact that economic relations with us might have on the Soviets' *potential* for creating military power, it used to be argued by those who proposed to abolish the barriers erected around 1950 against transactions with Communist states that a sufficient safeguard was to limit our exports to "non-strategic" items. However, slowly

should make the intention clear. Some care has been taken in the Postscript (below), where the pronouns "we" and "they" temporarily change hats, to make the point of view unmistakable.

the point of economics about the "fungibility" of factors of production through time has left its mark: *any* exchange—and particularly one involving high-technology Western goods or "disembodied" high Western technology—would leave the Communist states with resources changed in such a way that a given increment of military goods could subsequently be produced with a smaller loss to the non-military sector.

Also, it was observed, if we deny the Communist states certain goods, we merely induce them to undertake, in time, the production of the goods themselves (at a higher cost, to be sure). Thus, if we do not expect a military confrontation to be imminent, we shall merely have reduced our potential enemies' degree of economic dependence on us at the price of a temporary increase in hardship to them—an increase that, if it has any impact at all at the time, will soon be forgotten thereafter.

Another way to oppose a denial of trade for the sake of reducing Eastern military potential has been to maintain that in a Communist state the military budget has absolute priority—that is, attains at any given time the then desired level regardless of how little is left over. Evolving perceptions of Soviet domestic politics, however, have made this affirmation less plausible; non-military producers/consumers were discovered to be not without influence on the allocation of resources. So Moscow, receiving butter from abroad, might divert fewer (or no) domestic resources from guns to butter, while yet achieving its objective of such-and-such an increase in the supply of the latter to consumers pressing for more.

But what if an increased production of consumer goods, particularly durables, made possible by transactions with the West creates the need for many more, which have to be produced at the expense of military goods? It is often implied that Communist importers of a central item of a consumption system overlook how many other elements it includes, elements they will be impelled to procure once they have started building the system. Also, it may be predicted, the appetite of Eastern publics will be whetted by the increment of consumer goods their authorities grant them as a consequence of transactions with the West; this, it is foreseen, will in turn force the authorities to go much farther than they had originally intended in shifting the gross national product away from non-consumer goods (including military items).

Thus the export of high technology to the Soviet Union—and the probable ensuing increase in the rate of Soviet technological advance—would seem to put us into a potentially weaker military position, in

an epoch when Moscow may be under *some* pressure from consumers which it might otherwise have to satisfy at military expense. But such export would become militarily favorable to us if it indirectly induced Soviet leaders to yield to desires of consumers which we would have greatly *reinforced*.

Will the Politburo lend itself to the scenario that we have displayed before it? Does it not have a measure of control over the degree to which the population's ordinary desires will be satisfied, or even felt? Will such control not allow it to use indirectly the inputs we may be providing for substantial military advantage?

No, one might then respond, simply because the fraction of GNP at stake—the difference between Soviet GNP with the least forthcoming policy practicable, on the one hand, and under the most generous terms of credit at present envisaged, on the other hand—is too small to change the military balance between the Soviet Union and ourselves, or even NATO, significantly.

But might not our impact on Communist intentions, rather than capabilities, be more substantial? If it is, this would justify going beyond *normalization* to *economic aid*—for instance, by the government reducing risks so that otherwise unattractive deals become appealing to private enterprise.

According to apparently influential beliefs—though public expressions may go farther than actual expectations—the higher the level of economic relations between us and the Soviet Union, the more numerous the contacts with little conflict between Americans and Soviet citizens of all kinds and the lower the Politburo's fear and hostility with regard to us and its capacity—with regard to its own society—to act against us. All of this assumes a high level of ability, on our part, to penetrate Soviet society—more accurately, of the Politburo's willingness to let us, and our capacity to overcome its countermeasures—as well as a strong influence on the Politburo's conduct by elements of Soviet society which may have become more friendly to us. Each of these assumptions, while not disprovable, is dubious.

The higher the level of the West's economic relations with the East—and the higher, thereby, the Eastern growth rate—the more, it is claimed, the East will reduce the distance between its economic arrangements and ours. This, in turn, should cause the East to adopt more practices of the West, which, too, should reduce conflict. While these forecasts are not beyond possibility, questions similar to those formulated in the preceding paragraph can be raised about them. In addition, the probability of a ruling Politburo adopting Westernizing

"reforms" may vary directly with the stringency of the economic situation produced by the very arrangements it prefers; so that economic contributions from the West would be a substitute for changes away from Communist orthodoxy.

The higher the level of Soviet-American exchanges, the less, it is suggested, the Politburo will be inclined to put our contribution to its economy at risk by a forward policy. Major attempts to advance are likely to be undertaken by Moscow only to avoid losses or to secure gains of a size that would dwarf the economic benefits imperiled; and Washington may be more susceptible than Moscow to pressure by those whose *particular interests* require the maintenance of the economic status quo. We may even have made ourselves more dependent on the Politburo, with regard to our *national objectives*, than they on us.

Their Calculations: Soviet Reactions

Another Victory

In the United States, it is not feasible to pretend that it is only *they*—the Soviets—who have changed; nor is it practicable to deny that our change is at least in part due to the failure of previous policies.

We tend to concede more than needed. It would be at least plausible to suggest that it was the success of the "containment" policy as a whole which inflected Soviet conduct so that the new era became possible. But frequently we now impute symmetry to the "Cold War." There was no Soviet offensive, actual or potential, and hence no Western defense—just mutual mistaken fears. James Reston stands for many when he refers in passing to "the mistrust that . . . poisoned the relations between Washington and Moscow in the first generation after World War II."² "The pressures," Commerce Secretary Peterson states, "which are moving the Soviet Union towards . . . accommodation with the West *parallel* a . . . shift in U.S. foreign policy toward improving relations with the major communist powers." In fact, "as the United States, *like the Soviet Union*, is under *popular pressure* to reallocate resources to meet . . . social demands," we are "faced with an *exact parallel* to the Soviet situation. . . . We, *too*. . ."³ Too bad for our dubious habits, but good for all of us: our peoples just won't stand for our inveterate fearfulness and hostility any more.

It will hardly astonish the reader that there is no "exact parallel"

2. *The New York Times*, June 22, 1973.

3. *U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era* (Washington, D.C.), August 1972, p. 13; emphasis added.

to such declarations of ours in important, or even extant, Soviet pronouncements. The one modest approximation to the major American theme of symmetrical accommodation occurs when Brezhnev resolves to offer a treat to the important businessmen listening to him at Blair House, June 22, 1973. (I wonder whether they fully perceived the gift being bestowed on them.) There and only there he publicly admits past Soviet imperfection, in language whose meaning is clear enough to any practitioner of polite abstraction, though it contrasts with the language of the eminent Americans I have quoted, calling things (or alleged events) by simpler names:

In the past, in the field of . . . economic ties, we adapted ourselves to one system of relations, and we stopped short right there, and for some time refused to move onward to new forms. . . . We have . . . been prisoners of . . . old tendencies . . . old trends, and to this day we have not been able fully to break those fetters and to come out into the open air.

Not only does Brezhnev follow this unique admission of imperfection by observing that his side is, in any case, not worse than we

If I say this applies to us . . . that is certainly something that applies to yourselves as well

but he goes on to alleviate, as it were, his coming close to truth by departing from it quickly, at his own (insignificant) expense:

In the fairly recent past it was impossible . . . that one of our ministers, let us say, could . . . talk to one of you. . . . How could a representative of . . . the country of Lenin suddenly meet with a business executive of the U.S.? ⁴

Brezhnev's distance from truth at this point is all the more striking when one recalls the meeting, more than fifty years ago, between Lenin himself and the future chairman of Occidental Petroleum. Needless to say, between then and now the Party never regressed to "petty-bourgeois" conceptions of exchange and trade. Our dispositions on economic relations with the West, so goes the standard Soviet line, have not changed since the fall of 1917; it is the West which has repeatedly attempted to blockade us. Whenever it did so, we had to adopt countermeasures. Whenever the failure of such attempts "forced" the West to normalize their economic conduct toward us, we were content to respond in kind. "The maximal utilization of the

4. *The New York Times*, June 23, 1973.

possibilities of international cooperation and division of labor," as a standard formula has it, "is the traditional policy of the Soviet Union."⁵ Negatively, and in equally standard fashion, "we never were partisans of . . . autarky."⁶

The most vivid exposition of this theme is given by Yuri Zhukov writing in *Pravda* in the spring of 1973 (May 15). Here, 1973 is identical with 1918:

Let us remember with what interest and solicitude V. I. Lenin was concerned with the development of business relations with the U.S.A. even . . . when American armed forces were still on our soil . . . Already in June 1920 Lenin ordered the conclusion of a deal with an American corporation which proposed to furnish Soviet Russia, through Black Sea ports, 200 locomotives, cisterns, machines and other goods in exchange for raw materials. . . . In 1922, V. I. Lenin receives the American industrialist Armand Hammer and demands that Hammer be given every possible collaboration. "Here we have a tiny path to the American business world," Lenin writes members of the Politburo in a circular note—"and we must fully utilize that path."

Lots of American businessmen wanted in the early twenties precisely what they want in the early seventies, Zhukov continues:

Already then there were some . . . in the ruling circles of the U.S.A. . . . who thought it indispensable to enter on the path of "peaceful cohabitation" with the Soviet country, and Lenin willingly met them, negotiated, examined far-reaching plans of economic cooperation. . . . [In the fall of 1920] on Lenin's order negotiations begin with the American industrialist Vanderlip who, in the name of a whole group of corporations, proposes a deal of enormous dimension, extending to Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia; the American entrepreneurs are particularly interested in oil.

The only difference between then and now is in the balance of power within Washington, Senator Henry M. Jackson's predecessor prevailing:

The deal only falls through because . . . Secretary of State Hughes makes it conditional . . . upon the restoration of the bourgeois order in Russia.

5. For example, N. Shmelev, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 1 (January 1973), p. 1.

6. I. Ivanov, Conference sponsored by the Stanford Research Institute and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, April 1973 (mimeographed), p. 4.

Let the partisans of Petr E. Shelest not yet eliminated from the apparatus beware:

In March 1922 Lenin demands of his collaborator N. P. Gorbunov whether visas had been delivered to representatives of American capitalists who propose to furnish Russia with 40 million dollars worth of agricultural machines. "If they have not yet received the permission to enter," writes Lenin, "obtain with all means the names of those guilty of the red tape so that I can subject them to severe punishment."

The new era inaugurated by the President's voyage to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1972 is then, in the Soviet view proposed, the product of (a) Western, and in particular American, setbacks (the failure of economic warfare against the Soviet Union; the sharpening of competition between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; the threat and actuality of unemployment; deficits in balances of payments; and monetary crises) and (b) Soviet advances in all domains and respects. Such a conjunction has made true a prediction of Lenin's which it is customary to quote these days: "There is a force stronger than the wishes, the will and the decisions of any of the governments and classes hostile to us. That force is the general relationships in the world economy."⁷ "A missed opportunity never returns" proclaims a popular American proverb," according to *Pravda's* American correspondent in the late spring of 1973. "However," he pursues, "the dynamism of the Soviet Program . . . enunciated by the 24th Congress of our Party is such that conventional wisdom loses its ground before it." To be sure, "the U.S. was not able to utilize the favorable opportunities created almost four decades ago [when the United States recognized the U.S.S.R. and created the Export-Import Bank to extend credit to it]." Thus, "it was only very recently that the Export-Import Bank proceeded to fulfill its basic task." In these circumstances, "among American businessmen and even [sic] governmental officials what has become much more popular is . . . the proverb 'better late than never,'" a saying that is Russian.⁸

Not content with alleging that we have finally yielded to traditional Soviet aspirations, Moscow adds that it has been willing to accept our offerings only after we had also complied with "political" conditions. But the Soviets abstain from drawing up a list of such concessions allegedly obtained from Washington and Bonn, in particular (one imagines)—perhaps fearing that this would be helpful to the remaining

7. Quoted, for instance, by L. Eliseev, *S.Sh.A.*, June 1973, p. 88.

8. G. Shishkin, *Pravda*, June 12, 1973

partisans of the Cold War in these capitals, and also that it might stimulate Western allusions to Soviet counterparts (e.g., on Vietnam).

Instead, Moscow, elevating the debate, as the French would say, insists on a point of theory: advances in political relations bring about progress in economic ones, oftener than the other way around. ("Dialectical materialism" has seen any number of occasions when the "superstructure" was made to play the role ordinarily allotted to the "infrastructure," as convenient.) Thus, according to the minister of foreign trade, "the entire history of the Soviet Union's international ties" proves "Lenin's idea that better political relations help to make fuller use of the possibilities for trade and economic cooperation between countries with differing social systems."⁹ Instead of Lenin being fulfilled, he may now also be, discreetly, corrected (and that in the supreme "theoretical" publication, *Kommunist*). To be sure, as "V.I. Lenin taught," it is "the economic requirements of the capitalist countries which primarily motivate them to normalize political relations with the socialist countries." "But"—it has come to the famous Bolshevik "but" to become applicable to Lenin—"an important role is also played here by a reverse influence—that of capitalist policy on economics." In fact, "the implementation of the foreign policy program formulated by the 24th Congress has shown once again¹⁰ that the settlement of . . . political problems . . . opens the way for . . . economic relations."¹¹

The primacy of politics—the recent political advances made by the Politburo having been a necessary condition for the new economic era—thus established, one may with less emphasis acknowledge, in Patolichev's words, that, "at the same time," "economic relations are an important means of normalizing the international political situation."¹² Once having corrected Lenin, the theoretician quoted above observes that "on receiving an impetus from politics"—we see, he doesn't relent—"economic relations develop independently¹³ . . . push forward . . . political relations." "In this sense" (only) is it true that "the present stage of the development of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and major capitalist countries is . . . a lever for further successes in . . . normalizing the political situation in the world"

9. N. Patolichev, *Foreign Trade*, May 1973, p. 7.

10. It isn't even the first time Lenin has been proved wrong?

11. V. Gantman, *Kommunist*, No. 7 (1973); FBIS, June 12, 1973, p. A10.

12. Patolichev, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

13. To Marxist-Leninists this will call up Engels' footnote in the eighties and nineties to Marx' formulation in the fifties: once having been determined by the economic infrastructure, the superstructure develops independently.

("further," that is, with respect to the ones that are the very basis of the present).¹⁴

The new economic era having thus been established as both an effect and a cause of defeats for the "other social system" (as it is increasingly called—"capitalist" is still allowed, but "imperialist" has become rare and "American imperialist" is discarded in the present right turn) and of victories for the Party, that new era can then be exalted as a "qualitatively new stage in relations" between "socialist" and "advanced capitalist" countries.¹⁵

And then, in perpetuated Bolshevik sensibility, what only a moment ago appeared to be the success of one's "dynamism" (a term borrowed from the West at a time when it has already lost its luster there) turns out also to be a stern and gratifying submission to the necessity of an objective law of development. Particularly in 1972, when one had to accustom oneself to something new and a bit dismaying, and when the new line presumably was still opposed by those among whom Shelest was to fall—particularly then it was recalled that "the worldwide process of internationalizing economic life" is an "objective factor."¹⁶ Socialist countries, whatever their (unmentioned) preferences, simply "cannot ignore the objective trends towards internationalized production," trends "which are also operative in the capitalist world."¹⁷ Indeed, it is the very "special features of the present day scientific and technological revolution" which "make broad international cooperation necessary."¹⁸ The Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, D. Gvishiani, goes farther, abolishing not only present differences but also those between the present and the past (having forgotten about or relishing a holiday from Marx's rejection of "eternal categories" in favor of "historical" ones): "Economy," that well-connected top intellectual teaches the West Germans, "is always world economy."¹⁹

A year later (with habituation to the new situation, with victory over those who opposed the new policy in Moscow, and with substantial and promising yields from that policy, both economic and political), the universal language of contemporary managers (developed in the West, particularly by us) replaces the Marxist idiom ap-

14. *Ibid.*

15. See, e.g., Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 13; Y. Nikolayev, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 5 (1973); FBIS, May 24, 1973, p. G9.

16. V. Kazakevich, *International Affairs*, August 1972, p. 43.

17. A. Vetrov and V. Kazakevich, *Foreign Trade*, November 1972, p. 14.

18. V. Matveyev, *Izvestiia*, January 22, 1972; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 16, 1972, p. 9.

19. Interview in *Der Spiegel*, May 1, 1972.

propriate to a moment of passage. In the spring of 1973 another eminent intellectual, writing in a prominent place, recalls that "under the conditions of the . . . scientific and technical revolution . . . no single country . . . can develop the production of all types of output . . . with the same effectiveness."²⁰

This theoretician illustrates the dual mentality of so many Soviet intellectuals today by engaging in an excursion into creative Marxism-Leninism. Pretending to forget Stalin who abounded in this sense, he discovers the appearance, at an undisclosed moment, of "two world economies," with "two world markets," leading a parallel existence. What is happening now is that the two are "joined" by a "conglomeration" of "economic ties"—both aversion and attraction presumably being expressed by this heaping on of synonyms—so as to form a "world economic system." But the contributions of socialism and capitalism, respectively, to the creation of this good thing, the "world economic system," are, as we would expect, not equal: it is "under socialist conditions" that "the objective trend toward . . . the internationalization of economic relations" receives a new impetus.²¹ We Soviets didn't *have* to turn to Occidental Petroleum and Swindell-Dressler because our growth rate fell to about half of what it had been; we *chose* to do so in accordance with a command following from the very essence of socialism.

Or Has It Now Become Evident That We Are Condemned to Backwardness and Dependence?

Observing in the summer of 1972 to Secretary of Commerce Peterson that "we have vast treasures of energy and raw materials that can last for generations to come," Brezhnev did not continue, as an American somewhat earlier in the century would have done after making the same statement about *his* continent, by predicting a high growth rate of one's economy upon one's exploiting this bounty. Rather, the Soviet leader disclosed to his foreign guest what "we have decided at the highest level": "We are going to make those *available*, . . . we are willing to *share them* with you."²² Brezhnev no doubt remained the "charming person" he is²³ when making this announcement. Still, it is likely that the decision was, and continues to be, painful to those

20. N. Inozemtsev, *Pravda*, May 16, 1973; FBIS, May 22, 1973, pp. A8-9.

21. *Ibid.*, p. A5.

22. *U.S. News and World Report*, September 4, 1972, p. 43; emphasis added.

23. Secretary George P. Shultz, *Novoe vremia*, No. 22 (1973); FBIS, June 21, 1973, p. G2.

whose decades of political activity cover several periods in which the point was forcefully made that one was fairly soon to "overtake and surpass" the West in general, and the United States in particular. "You have seen Siberia and its immense possibilities," Kosygin told a group of prominent West German businessmen returning from that part of the Soviet Union (in early 1971); "come and get it!" Kosygin's dismay over the Soviets' inability to develop their "immense possibilities" themselves is perhaps counteracted as much as revealed by the brutality of his invitation (turning passivity into activity), and by his going on to recall situations more favorable to the Politburo. "Well now," he is said to have continued, "have you conquered Siberia?" When the head of the German group quipped back "you know, we are modest people," Kosygin reminded him that "that wasn't always so."²⁴

If the Politburo feels that the Germans-Americans-Japanese are on top now with regard to the economic development of the Soviet Union, it may help its members to accept their present predicament if they remind themselves of the inverse situation at the end of World War II. At the very time when the new economic era gets under way, *Pravda* quotes the words that Lenin allegedly spoke half a century before to young Armand Hammer: "Russia is a backward country with huge untapped resources. . . . We should avail ourselves of everything you [foreign capitalists] have which is of value."²⁵ This may both help the present Politburo to accept what it may sense as a second New Economic Policy and stimulate subdued despair: after fifty years (they will argue), with all our efforts and all our accomplishments, we are still backward, still in need of economic aid from the really big ones, the capitalist centers. Will we ever be different? Will we ever be out of a predicament where we have to offer political-military concessions for economic advantage, as when the director-general of TASS (Leonid M. Zamyatin), talking with American newsmen during Brezhnev's visit to the United States in the early summer of 1973, points out solemnly, first, that "long-term and large-scale trade agreements" do "create trust," and, second, that where trust exists, it is always easier to settle such questions as SALT II. All of which the journalists reasonably take to mean, in the words of R. W. Apple, Jr., that, according to the Soviet spokesman, "the limitation of strategic arms and the mutual reduction of forces in Europe would proceed more rapidly if U.S.-Soviet trade could be expanded."²⁶

24. *Der Spiegel*, No. 3 (1973), p. 62.

25. *Pravda*, November 9, 1972; quoted by *Soviet Analyst* (London), March 15, 1973, p. 3.

26. *The New York Times*, June 21, 1973.

The Politburo obviously deplores some aspects of the economic situation, but it is willing to face them publicly to a modest degree. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the share of high-technology goods (and licenses) in Soviet exports: satisfactory only toward the developing countries, limited toward the socialist ones, and puny toward the capitalist ones, as the evidence of the paragraphs to follow seems to show.

To be sure, the future will here be invoked to redress the present: "The proportion in exports of machinery, equipment and other manufactured goods will increase further [sic]." ²⁷ And even though current distribution may not yet justify it, this noble category can be accorded first place in descriptions of the country's pattern of exports: "The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries are suppliers of many goods on the world market, including modern machinery and equipment, . . . raw materials, . . . semi- and fully-manufactured products." ²⁸ Thus, the category whose prominence (in contrast, say, to U.S. wheat sales) is characteristic of the exports of an under-developed country appears sandwiched between categories characteristic of high development. Also, when one's overall performance is low in one large domain, there still may be subsectors where one does very well indeed: "*In many kinds of machines and equipment,*" three of the most prominent Soviet spokesmen announce with safe vagueness, "the Soviet Union is the biggest exporter in the world." ²⁹

An unsatisfactory state of affairs may be tacitly admitted by demanding redress. "A way has to be found," it may be insisted, "of improving the pattern of the imports by the industrial capitalist countries from the Soviet Union," notably through "substantially increasing the share of machines, equipment and other finished products." ³⁰ Threats are added, at least in the early phases of the new era: as "the commodity pattern of East European countries' export to Western Europe" does not reflect fully either the productive or the commercial facilities of these countries, "there is little hope for a stable growth of exports to the socialist countries . . . without increased imports of manufactured goods from them." ³¹ East-West trade "will only expand considerably when the West begins to buy large quantities of machinery and equipment in the socialist countries." ³²

27. A. Voinov, *Foreign Trade*, August 1972, p. 52.

28. L. Lyubovtseva, *International Affairs*, December 1972, p. 100.

29. V. Alkhimov, G. Arbatov, N. Inozemtsev, *Izvestiia*, May 5, 1973; emphasis added.

30. B. Pichugin, *International Affairs*, February 1972, p. 14.

31. Vetrov and Kazakevich, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

32. M. Burinsky, *Foreign Trade*, April 1972, p. 25.

But as the threat of economic reprisals by the Soviet Union against the West's lack of interest in its higher technology is hardly apt to be pressing—and how could it be that?—what it all amounts to is resignation. Having observed that “raw materials, fuels and foodstuff predominate in exports from socialist countries towards Western Europe, while machines, equipment and other finished products predominate in exports from capitalist countries towards Eastern Europe”; having pointed out that “this structure of commerce between the two European sub-regions” is “an obstacle becoming stronger and stronger on the path of a Pan-European division of labor which would be both efficient and [sic] advantageous for the socialist countries”—having done all this, a prominent Soviet spokesman concludes lamely that “the elimination [of this state of affairs] . . . will demand protracted and considerable efforts by both sides.”³³

But such forthrightness is unusual; silence about the displeasing is more common. The only time I have seen “the prospect of the transportation of large consignments of American grain” mentioned was in the observation that it is “a matter of great interest to American farming and business circles.”³⁴

The future, as we have seen, is always at one's disposal to redress the present. For in the future—not named—“provision has also been made for a considerable increase of agricultural output,” which “will greatly enlarge the Soviet Union's export potentialities.”³⁵

Whenever foreign economic relations displease, one may restore one's spirits by recalling that, while of course we don't want to, we could so easily become autarkic. “The Soviet Union . . . is able to promote its economic advancement with its own resources.”³⁶ “In the absence of an alternative,” another specialist recalls, “the Soviet Union . . . disposes of all that is necessary for attaining [sic] a high level of development while relying only on its own forces”³⁷ “Our country,” declare the Vice-President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (A. Vinogradov) and the Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology (D. Gvishiani), “[possesses] opportunities for resolving any scientific and technical tasks with its own forces.”³⁸

It is not under duress, but only for greater advantage that we engage ourselves economically abroad. While today, as the minister for

33. N. Inozemtsev, *Europe 1980* (Leiden and Geneva, 1972), p. 127.

34. I. D. Seregin, *S.Sh.A.*, November 1972; JPRS 57659, p. 83.

35. Pichugin, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

37. Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

38. *Pravda*, June 15, 1973; FBIS, June 22, 1973, p. G1.

foreign trade points out, "our country is practically in a position to meet all its basic needs for machinery and equipment from its own . . . resources," it is "thanks to its foreign trade" that "our economy can . . . import products at less expense. . . . Purchasing machines, equipment and licenses"—how that rankles!—"results in . . . lower production costs . . . and also . . . [in the production] of new high-standard products."³⁹

There's something in our foreign economic relations that is at first sight distressing? (Soviet sentiments seem, we see, to attach themselves to matters economic, ours to what we expect their political consequences to be.) Closer inspection will show that it's just what every advanced country is doing. Thus, neglecting the difference between consumers' goods associated with subsistence, such as wheat, and those indicative of affluence, a Soviet spokesman explains "the marked increase in the import of consumers' goods" entirely by "the rise in the Soviet people's standard of living." Yes, "the Soviet Union . . . continues to import large quantities of equipment"; but that is merely "taking advantage of the international division of labor," as all the other major industrial countries do.⁴⁰ In fact, importing equipment is a sign not of backwardness, but of advanced status: "There will be a demand for the latest types of equipment" precisely "on account of the large scale on which . . . factories are to be modernized."⁴¹ Also, "with . . . modern rates and scale of technical progress, all countries, including the most developed, consider it advantageous . . . to acquire licenses abroad," so that the Soviet Union is merely no exception.⁴²

Soviet leaders are sensitive to "bourgeois" (now also a rare word) allegations of "some kind of 'one-sided interest' of the Soviet Union in developing trade with the United States."⁴³ "The point here is," another specialist observes, precisely "not that the U.S.S.R., as bourgeois propaganda alleges, is interested in promoting trade [with capitalist countries] to a larger extent than these countries desire trade with the U.S.S.R."⁴⁴ It's the other way around: "Since [October 1957, the date of Sputnik] . . . literally a stream . . . of inquiries and proposals has come from the United States concerning the exchange of scientists, specialists and of technical information."⁴⁵

39. Patolichev, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

40. Pichugin, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

42. *S.Sh.A.*, April 1972; FBIS, May 3, 1972, p. G10.

43. A. Makeyev, Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank, *Trud*, March 31, 1973; FBIS, April 5, 1973, p. G5.

44. Pichugin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

45. N. A. Berdennikov, *S.Sh.A.*, November 1972; JPRS 57659, p. 2.

Yes, the Soviet Union needs foreign "capital investment for the utilization of [her] natural resources."⁴⁶ But rather than permitting themselves to dwell on Soviet incapacity to exploit these resources with equipment of their own, Soviet spokesmen stress that it is the Soviet Union which possesses what foreigners merely desire. "You have vast natural resources," a prominent businessman from the Federal Republic of Germany is approvingly quoted; "this is highly attractive to us."⁴⁷ In fact, it is "to meet the needs of Western countries in industrial raw materials" that "large additional investments"—naturally, then, of Western capital—"will be required . . . in the Soviet Union."⁴⁸

It is not they (the Soviets) who are rejecting us (the Americans), it is we who are refusing them. While "one can already observe . . . competition between capitalist firms for access to the Soviet market and participation in large-scale common projects," Soviet officials have come to the conclusion that "far from all industrial firms of the West dispose of the indispensable capital, experience and technical knowledge" to perform.⁴⁹ On those projects that the Soviets finally do accept they impose severe conditions. "The Russians," an Italian top-manager is quoted with evident relish, "have perfectly learnt to put the seller, when several of them compete, into a difficult position."⁵⁰

As long as the West dares to put extraneous conditions on a normal economic transaction, the Soviets refuse to consider the matter at all. When in 1970–1971 Washington "proceeded from the premise that the U.S.S.R. was interested to a greater extent than the United States in the development of . . . trade" and that "by virtue of this, trade could be conducted with the U.S.S.R. while securing concessions 'in a wider context'," such a strategy clearly could not be successful⁵¹—a point equally clearly compatible with that "strategy" working.

When there is something in the transaction itself, rather than its origins, which is embarrassing, one may simply omit the offending element from one's description, suggest a pleasing substitute, or be nobly abstract. "The point in question," Kosygin may say about long-term agreements with Western countries, is "cooperation . . . in the elaboration of several major economic questions, linked with *the use of the . . . resources of the Soviet Union*, construction of industrial enterprises, search for new technical solutions."⁵²

46. S. Shershnev, *S.Sh.A.*, April 1972; FBIS, May 3, 1972, p. G10.

47. Kazakevich, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

48. Vetrov and Kazakevich, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

50. *Ibid.*

49. Shmelev, *op. cit.*

51. Shershnev, *op. cit.*, p. G2.

52. To the Supreme Soviet, November 24, 1971; FBIS, November 26, 1971, p. 13; emphasis added.

Leaving out the place *where* something is going to occur accomplishes a lot. "The cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.," according to the "estimations of representatives of the American administration and American 'business circles'," explains an observer, "could occur in such branches as the exploitation of mineral resources, the construction of enterprises for the extraction and exploitation of oil and gas, enterprises in the petrochemical, pharmaceutical and food industry, the perfecting of port infrastructures, computerizing truck flow, the development of container transport"—a welter of things to be done, and no word about the where of them. That comes a bit later, perhaps rendered easier by a first phase allowing for the fantasy of balanced activities in the two continents: it's a question of the role of "*American firms in the exploitation of some*"—perhaps just a few—"natural resources of the Soviet Union"—again, it's they who are pressing for it, not we—"in the import of which the U.S.A. is interested."⁵³

At times, U.S.-U.S.S.R. symmetry may be asserted rather than merely implied. "East-West cooperation in the construction of large industrial and power installations on *each other's territory*," we may be told, "is now no longer a rarity." Trouble arises when one proceeds to cases. For if "Western companies are taking part in building *automobile* works, a synthetic fibre plant and other industrial installations in the U.S.S.R. and other CMEA countries," the socialist countries are merely "building *enterprises with advanced technologies* in Western Europe."⁵⁴ One has to make do with an Eastern potential matching a Western performance when Francois Ortoli is approved for this estimate: "While Renault is capable of building a plant in the U.S.S.R.,⁵⁵ Soviet industry . . . is fully [sic] capable of taking part in industrial activity in this country [France]."⁵⁶ It is only subsequently that we hear about "Soviet-French cooperation in producing metal-cutting machine tools,"⁵⁷ a lag presumably due to the writer's awareness that in Franco-Soviet ventures the French give more in technology than they receive.

Finally, American contributions to Soviet development may be removed from attention by proposals for "joint ventures" of the two benevolent giants on behalf of the world at large, and by detailed descriptions of current beginnings of such enterprises. It is standard to suggest a "combining of . . . [Soviet and American] achievements

53. G. Bazhenov, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, March 1973, p. 94; emphasis added.

54. Kazakevich, *op. cit.*, p. 46; emphasis added.

55. Which Fiat, after all, has done.

56. Kazakevich, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

57. *Ibid.*

... in such important matters of the present era" as the preservation of natural resources, the extraction of resources from the world's oceans, and space research⁵⁸—ventures, were the U.S.S.R. and the United States to engage in them jointly, to which their contributions might be roughly equal, and from which not only they but the whole world would receive benefits.

Still, the reality is one where the West, in the new economic era, engages in transactions with the Soviet Union which remind one of the West's dealing with such a Soviet neighbor as Iran, a developing country. That this is not lost on the Soviet rulers is, it would seem to me, made plausible by the nuances of their treatment of the matter, as sketched in the preceding paragraphs.

The shame about backwardness and dependence, which I have tried to illustrate, has not always been present. During the previous bout of heavy reliance on foreign contributions to economic development, from the NEP through the Second Five-Year Plan, the shame was, it seems to me, negligible. Backwardness could be laid to the ancient regime; one's consent to dependence becomes a subject of pleasure, pride, and self-righteousness in connection with the Bolshevik emphasis on "utilizing" all (including the most distasteful) means, if they be "necessary" for a transcendent goal. A third of a century later the situation is more difficult. There is no rejected past to which to pass the buck; and the Bolshevik penchant for viewing the present as an intrinsically worthless time of passage to a future transfiguration has weakened. Hence, the shame.

By this argument, embarrassment may then be absent among those who have retained the earlier sensibility, as seems to be the case for a member of Gosplan (V. Spandarian) writing in *Pravda* in the spring of 1973 (May 8). From the outset, he does something now rare: he links the painful present to the all-justifying future. It is "the grandiose tasks of building Communism" which "demand the mobilization of all forces and means, of all resources." Hence, "in their collaboration with foreign firms Soviet organizations are governed by the Leninist thesis concerning the indispensability of links with capitalist countries in the interest of socialist construction." Such old-fashioned faith and a presumably long perspective—didn't capitalism take hundreds of years to mature?—allow sober forthrightness where others are squeamish:

In ... present conditions there appears the possibility to proceed ... to agreements between Soviet organizations and foreign firms concerning collaboration in the exploitation of natural resources

58. Shershnev, *op. cit.*, p. G10.

of the U.S.S.R. and the creation on our territory of industrial enterprises. . . . The U.S.S.R. . . . will obtain . . . also advanced⁵⁹ . . . newest equipment and advanced technical experience.

Join Them and You May Yet Beat Them

Being, for all its efforts to obscure or deny, very much on the asking end, the Politburo, even in earlier dispositions, would not want to be unpleasant. But this powerful reason for avoiding offensiveness happens to operate at an advanced stage in the Soviet rulers' long march toward the difficult insight that, contrary to their primitive conviction, a premium on rudeness is not always awarded by history. It is perhaps because of this nearing insight that the Politburo has resorted more thoroughly than ever to a soft style—which has, to be sure, several well-known antecedents, but whose quantity, in the cliché of dialectics, this time makes for several novel qualities. In doing so, it seemed until the late summer of 1973 that the Soviet rulers might increase not only the chance of obtaining the economic benefits they are after, but also the probability of making the sharp political gains that eluded them in their earlier pursuit.

Since the time when the pages to follow were written, in mid-1973, the chain of reactions initiated by enhanced repression (noted below as a component of the new Soviet stance) and intensified dissent in the Soviet Union has reduced the effectiveness of the Politburo's soft style in foreign relations, though it has at the time at which I add these remarks (mid-October 1973) not impaired the Soviet rulers' obstinate resolve to persevere in their "24th Congress" line, presumably expecting that their lack of response to Western "provocations" (now, as I shall note, called that more in private than in public) will permit their policy to outlast what they may predict to be a flurry of Western omeriness, as well as contribute to its cessation.

Rather than attempting at this point to take account in full of the changes that have occurred since mid-1973, I shall—while not eschewing references to them—analyze the situation of around the time of Brezhnev's visit to this country. This is not mere history. The attitudes then prevailing, while momentarily overlaid by the sensational irruption of returns to older reactions, have not become negligible; in fact, they may become dominant once more in a not remote future.

To bring out how much Soviet style has changed within a few years, one might recall an incident forgotten, I would surmise, by most of

59. A prestigious word very rarely used in this context, as it admits to Soviet inferiority in technology.

those who were not professionally concerned with it. In March 1969 the Warsaw Pact issued another call for a conference on European security. "The Budapest appeal," Harlan Cleveland, then U.S. Ambassador to NATO, recalls, "was better dressed than at its earlier début, wrapped in the chilliest of Cold War accusations against the West, at a Bucharest meeting in 1966." In the month following the Soviet move, the North Atlantic Council was to celebrate in Washington the twentieth anniversary of the Alliance. Some of the foreign ministers assembling for this occasion were, Cleveland remembers, "sorely tempted" to respond favorably to the Pact's appeal: an important move of the Politburo seemed to be about to make significant progress. Had nothing more happened on the Soviet side, the same participant-observer conjectures, "The Ministers . . . would probably have . . . [mentioned favorably] the Budapest appeal in their final communiqué." But then

... as a prelude to the . . . meeting in Washington, which had been publicly scheduled for months, the Soviet Navy conducted in the Atlantic . . . the largest naval exercise they had ever put on there . . . [and] nearly all of these ships after the maneuvers passed through the Straits of Gibraltar to bring the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron up to . . . [its] greatest strength. Then . . . the day before the NATO session . . . a . . . statement [was] . . . issued by the government of the Soviet Union—berating the Alliance . . . in language reminiscent of the early 50s.

The Ambassador remembers:

The Soviet statement fell like a great stone into the Ministerial meeting. The . . . text first became available . . . from Agence France Presse. . . . I watched the AFP ticker item hit the . . . delegations, passed from Minister to Minister with whispers of shock and disbelief. I could almost feel the temperature drop. . . . Why, I asked myself, do the Soviets so often slap the West across the face with a dead fish just when . . . ? ⁶⁰

Some members of the Soviet ruling group may have asked that old question (no doubt not even novel to them), this time more insistently, of themselves and their colleagues; and the ensuing resolve to reform may have been more genuine, effective, and enduring even in the face of "provocations" such as those offered by the West in the summer and autumn of 1973.

60. Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 155–159.

One reason, I would surmise, was the sharp change in the military balance in the Politburo's favor during the preceding years. Among the several beliefs that made up the traditional Bolshevik faith in the efficacy of rudeness, the most ingrained, I would conjecture, was their conviction that when one apprehends that an enemy endowed with military superiority may attack, defeat, even annihilate one, an intensely hostile tone toward him is an indispensable element of one's arsenal for dissuading him from using his superior potential. As that potential disappeared, the other beliefs favoring a stance of hostility—e.g., its alleged usefulness for making advances—could perhaps be examined in the light of accumulating and hardly supporting experience.

In any case, Politburo behavior from 1971 on leaves little doubt on this point. A majority in the Politburo has greatly increased its awareness that there are many situations where one most fully "utilizes" another's weakness not by pressing against him, but rather by giving him a semblance of support; many circumstances where one maximizes the probability of a desired change, again, not by pressing for it, but rather by appearing to find the status quo livable, while suggesting that there might be something better in the direction in which one had been vainly straining. Thus the Politburo has seemingly discovered that, for a while at least, the most effective way to work for our removal from Western Europe is *not* to work for it.

From its origins until a recent date, the Politburo had taken it for granted that the optimal moment to counterattack is the earliest one; and the mode in which to do so, in kind—only more strongly. It now knows better. For instance, influential Americans have, as we have seen earlier, accompanied their acceptance of our new economic closeness to the Soviet Union with public forecasts of "political gains" therefrom; forecasts both, no doubt, expected by members of the Politburo and repugnant, even frightening, to them. In cruder times, Moscow would have responded with blasts to hope. This response, however, would have reduced our enthusiasm, and perhaps moderated our offers.

Now they do it differently. They have resolved, I would surmise, to start with the stance that their major countermeasure against our real or imaginary penetrations should be a latter-day application of Lenin's dictum at the introduction of the NEP in the late winter of 1921: we can allow a strengthening of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements in city and countryside on condition of putting the Mensheviks in prison. (This saying, I feel confident, has been frequently heard in office conversations among Moscow influentials, 1972–1973). The

advice was acted on in 1921, and it has been acted on again, well before the matter became prominent in the summer of 1973. As to the changes in Soviet economic organization called for by Americans, the Politburo has proved capable of not budging (while hardly rebuffing), or not permitting itself to be victimized by the high visibility that both its previous "relaxation" (minute though it was) and its recent "tightening" (limited though that was, too) afforded to the few dissenters who had been incautiously permitted to accumulate merit abroad. According to a Western analyst writing in the spring of 1973, the latest plans for industrial reorganization then developed in Moscow took a hard line on the monopoly of foreign trade, and there has been a shift on the issue of the ruble's convertibility with Western currencies from "vague and occasionally accommodative formulations" to "outright rejection."⁶¹ At the same time—this is my point—rebuttals to numerous declarations that a main U.S. objective in intensifying economic relations with the Soviet Union is to accomplish what the Politburo no doubt calls, within its walls, the "restoration of capitalism" there—such rebuttals have been infrequent and sober. Without this sort of response, the atmosphere in the United States would not have developed so favorably toward the Soviet Union as it did until recently—a condition that, it may seem to us, was easy to fulfill, but that, I submit, came hard to the Soviet Union.

It is rare to see the traditional standard virulence in verbal counter-attack perpetuated, as when we read that "a significant section of the U.S. *bourgeois* press . . . cynically referring to the agreements reached in May 1972 . . . are *essentially* demanding for themselves a 'free hand' for ideological *diversions* and *provocations under the guise* of 'extending contacts,' the 'free exchange of ideas' and so forth."⁶² In the more restrained style now in the ascendant, taking a view more broad and more serene, it will be recalled that "the history of the Soviet Union's economic relations with other countries shows examples illustrating the attempts of imperialist circles . . . to launch *unfounded* attacks on the foreign trade monopoly . . .," even "to use trading channels for purposes *hostile to socialism*."⁶³

Going even farther, these circles "spare no effort to circumvent . . . [the foreign trade] monopoly . . . to establish direct trade contacts between capitalist firms and individual Soviet enterprises."⁶⁴ But such

61. Henry Schaefer, Radio Free Europe, report of May 24, 1973, p. 26.

62. Y. Nikolayev, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 5 (1973); FBIS, May 24, 1973, p. G9; emphasis added.

63. I. Kovan, *Foreign Trade*, No. 4 (1973), p. 2; emphasis added.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

alleged penetrations are merely met by recalling that "the importance of maintaining . . . the foreign trade monopoly was repeatedly emphasized . . . by the Party's leading bodies,"⁶⁵ that it "is of course absolutely unrealistic to make the development of economic cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world dependent on a change in the . . . foreign trade mechanism of our country."⁶⁶ Indeed, the foreign trade monopoly arises "from the socialist ownership of the means of production and the planned nature of the socialist economy."⁶⁷ This monopoly is required even more (in Bolshevik sensibility, something already totally commanded can always become even more so) when the Politburo's economic policy bears some resemblance to the NEP. One is reminded of the ancient resolution (by the 13th Party Congress of early 1924) that demanded the maintenance and strengthening of the foreign trade monopoly "particularly in conditions of the . . . NEP . . . [also] as an instrument to protect the country's wealth from being plundered by . . . foreign capital."⁶⁸ Such is the new moderation in counterattack, a moderation strikingly exhibited in the late summer and early fall of 1973 by the tone of restraint with which Soviet leaders and media (no doubt following a directive from the top) responded to the highly unexpected and offensive (in both senses of the word) Western moves against them which then emerged and developed.

Counterattack may even be—an unheard of thing in the past—withheld altogether when it plainly appears to be harmful, as in the case of Sakharov's attack against the regime. The latter proved capable of switching over to silence when the mounting intensity of the dissenter's onslaught evoked a rising response abroad. Or counterattack may be renounced from the start and replaced by more than silence, the transmutation of real enemy into pretended friend. Take a minor but significant case, the Soviet treatment of the American pronouncement that perhaps went farthest in envisaging the new economic era as an instrument of political penetration. A forecast was made by John Hardt and George Holliday that in the new epoch, to cite the close paraphrase of *The New York Times*, "the Soviet Union . . . [might] allow foreign companies to have more [*sic*] influence on its decision-making" (June 10, 1973).⁶⁹ Now, apart from this frosting on the cake,

65. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 8; emphasis added.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

69. John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday, *U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology, Transfer, and Diplomacy*. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, June 10, 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 74.

much in the report—though it assesses the potential for economic gains for the United States as small—favors recently projected developments on grounds acceptable to the Politburo. What that body—through the formal or informal directives issuing from it—has now added to its already respectable arsenal is the capacity not to react at all to (merely verbal) hostility, but rather to use all the congenial elements that compose that hostility in a compound that now can be thoroughly decomposed:

The report gives an all-round appraisal of ... the authors of the report note ... the report admits ... the authors of the report point out ... the report refutes ... the authors of the report point to ... the report stresses. ...

—all verbs devoid of badness and hence reserved in Soviet language to introduce affirmations that share that property.

As to the black aspect of the piece, it is being whitened by a procedure already observed in operation above, the use of words that cover the bad with the good: "The authors of the report believe that ... trade would bring ... *political* advantages too."⁷⁰

From its beginnings until a recent date any given stance of the Politburo was apt to be dominated by the combat it was conducting against its enemies of the time. It has now become capable of, and is in fact, doing otherwise. For the Politburo (by which, in such a context, is always meant, of course, a majority of its members) may have sensed that the very prevalence of high hostility (*never mind against which targets*) in its public posture rendered more plausible its enemies' allegation that, despite its protracted protestations and prolonged inactions, it was still bent upon political-military aggression. On the other hand, pervasive *mildness* in public stance might undercut such suspicions; it might even dominate, in Western perceptions, a simultaneous raising of military posture, which, if accompanied by the earlier disagreeable tone of voice, might have turned out to be starkly impressive. As it is, few in the West outside the limited circles of military specialists and last cold warriors have been impressed by the recent changes in the military balance favorable to Moscow.

For example, instead of conveying, if not declaring, that one expects enmity, one now avows the contrary. "I've seen your picture in the paper," declares Brezhnev when meeting Senator Church, "and I always thought, from your face, that I'd like you." According to the

70. Radio Moscow in English, June 10, 1973; FBIS, June 11, 1973, p. G7; emphasis added.

journalist who reports this, the Senator is "delighted."⁷¹ Stating what is already obvious and still surprising, an observer (John Newhouse) in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1973) notes that "the Soviets . . . are challenging neither NATO nor the . . . European Community" (p. 356), after a quarter of a century of making only limited progress with an unrelenting stance of hostility. Instead of continuing their traditional presentation of these entities as dangerously evil, the Soviet rulers are now content with suggesting—more in sorrow than in anger, more in regret than in sorrow, more in hope of progress than in regret—that without these organizations things would be (even) better than they are. For the Politburo has finally understood that such mellowness is more damaging than their traditional pushing and pulling. "In accepting the Common Market," Newhouse discerns—a maneuver that may seem routine to us but that comes hard to them—"Moscow hopes to blunt any incentives . . . to develop comparable political and defense institutions."⁷²

Enemies may still be presented in the older vein. Thus, according to *Kommunist* in the spring of 1973, "the opposition to detente . . . still has substantial reserves," so that "it is indispensable to exercise unceasing vigilance"—a dread word still connected with the liquidation of Party cadres by Stalin—"and to be ready to repel any schemes of the aggressive . . . circles of imperialism."⁷³ To be sure, in the late summer and early fall of 1973 this presentation of the West increased, as already noted, but only in moderate response to what was no doubt to the Politburo an unexpected Western counteroffensive instigated by Western top levels. But prior to this what was in the ascendant, particularly in the domain under discussion, was a more harmless enemy: Jackson-Javits-Meany, whose wickedness then appeared to be dwarfed by the futility of their endeavors. In earlier times, any enemy of the Politburo, however limited his power, was apt to be judged as a potentially grave danger to be countered fiercely. The regime's present difficulty with a few famous dissenters may show what happens if every effort is not made to stop the rot at the start. "As influential and active as the anti-Soviet forces in contemporary America may be," remarks a Soviet journalist in non-standard and contrasting fashion, "it becomes ever more difficult for them to oppose the wish of Americans to . . ."⁷⁴

71. R. W. Apple, Jr., from Washington, June 19, 1973; *The New York Times*, June 20, 1973.

72. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, p. 359.

73. V. Gantman, *Kommunist*, No. 7 (1973), p. 40.

74. M. Fedorov, *Novoe vremia*, No. 21 (1973), p. 19.

Yet further reducing its initial ascription of enmity to most sectors of the world not controlled by it, the Politburo has accelerated the process of *entering into* innumerable activities from which its members had earlier held themselves aloof—a stance that had magnified the impression of hostility they conveyed. Just as the Party used to proclaim itself of “a special kind,” so did the Soviets at large. Now, while they maintain, though in less shrill fashion, an assertion of unique excellence, they have taken further strides in transmuting their appearance from that of forbidding and menacing loners into that of omnipresent and at least tolerable joiners. To use the vocabulary of Trotskyites (discouraging on whether to remain by themselves or to go where others are, so as in the end to dominate a larger sphere), the Politburo has considerably enhanced its degree of “entrism.” “Ties” with the West, rather than mere “relations,” have in the Party’s public stance become one of those strived-for goods, such as the “ties” of the Party with the people. Such ties, their multiplication and tightening, are now no longer commonly presented as directed against a specific person, nor even as in the service of a particular objective; they rather appear (in another striking departure from the previous disposition to view the present as merely a means to a transfigured future) as ends in themselves. That there have been, according to Newhouse, “more contacts between the two halves of Europe in the past three years [1970–1972] than in all the preceding years since World War II”⁷⁵ may indeed be something which the Politburo in private receives in unmodified Bolshevik fashion—as a means to more power, and a gloriously economic one—but which it publicly welcomes for its own sake (an obvious condition for the new conduct being productive). The new relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, Brezhnev exults on American television, “are all becoming part of the daily lives of the [two] peoples.”⁷⁶ At the same time, his minister of foreign trade makes a joke—innocent, yet perhaps also revealing that means have not really become ends in the Kremlin: “I am a devout supporter,” the old Bolshevik Patolichev quips in the Blair House, “of more contacts, contacts, contacts which would bring more contracts, contracts, contracts.”⁷⁷

The Politburo has learned to cater to the American belief in a direct relationship between the number of “constructive” agreements we are signing with a country and some desirable quality of our relationship with it. That the trend away from confrontation is in the process of

75. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, p. 353.

76. June 24, 1973; *The New York Times*, June 25, 1973.

77. June 22, 1973; *The New York Times*, June 23, 1973.

becoming "an established pattern" is, to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (William J. Casey) indicated by "the impressive *number*" of agreements signed in Peking and Moscow in 1972 as well as by the prospects of *additional* ones."⁷⁸ Brezhnev points out to Americans that these new agreements, when signed, together with those concluded during the past year, will "make up *an impressive file* of documents on cooperation in some widely ranging field."⁷⁹ Such emphasis discourages conjectures on the amount and direction of that file's impact.

And then there are institutions. Completing their entry into the pre-existing ones and becoming charter members of numerous new ones in which the present higher level of cooperation is embodied, the Politburo undoes what it probably regards as two of the great Stalin's mistakes, the refusal to enter into the "Marshall Plan" organizations and the absence from the central bodies of the United Nations at the time when the war in Korea broke out.

On the occasion of the 22nd Washington State International Trade Fair held in Seattle during the summer of 1972, the Seattle-King County Economic Development Council, one of its members reports, arranged numerous activities for the 80-member Soviet delegation "so they could become better acquainted with our area and its business leaders"—a cocktail reception, a formal dinner, to be sure, but also "individual visits to American homes by the Soviets." Another effort by Americans to multiply contacts? Not quite, because all this was done "at the request of the Russians."⁸⁰ While it is not certain that we have converted Soviet officials to our taste, it seems plausible that those higher authorities in Moscow who presumably requested their emissaries to request lots of personal contacts with Americans have become aware of our proclivities; or, rather, have finally understood the importance of "utilizing" them. "To live at peace," Brezhnev tells Americans on television, expressing a belief that is more surely theirs than his, "we must trust each other; and to trust each other, we must know each other better."⁸¹ Whatever the Politburo's scepticism, or worse, as to whether this is true, it appears to have yielded to the awareness that these are beliefs of ours which are not neglected without cost.

78. April 27, 1973; Department of State Bulletin, May 21, 1973; emphasis added.

79. On American television, June 24, 1973; *The New York Times*, June 25, 1973; emphasis added.

80. Merle D. Adlum, *The American Review of East-West Trade*, November 1972, p. 33.

81. June 24, 1973; *The New York Times*, June 25, 1973.

All of which may have seemed to the Soviet rulers, until a very recent date, noticeably cost-effective. For one thing, the Politburo was not challenged, until the mid-summer of 1973, on its accustomed degree of control within its domain. For another, it maintains, or improves, its military posture—a matter on which it has not yet been seriously queried. Furthermore, it enhances the importance of those in the West whose economic stakes in transactions with the Soviet Union may make them averse, say, to economic sanctions against a politically or militarily forward Politburo. The latter is probably coming to appreciate more fully the impact of *short-run* interests of *particular* sectors within the “capitalist class” on the policies of a capitalist state that Bolsheviks used to idealize as the guardian of the *long-run* and *general* interests of that class. “It is not unreasonable,” Ambassador Green remarks about what may be a similar situation, “for Chinese leaders to believe that U.S. businessmen who benefit from U.S.-PRC trade might influence American . . . opinion in ways that may be *mutually* beneficial.”⁸² Would it not be even more reasonable for Chinese leaders to foresee that such influence would be *unilaterally* beneficial to them, for they would worry less about the possibility that Shanghai businessmen interested in U.S.-PRC trade would arouse Chinese opinion on behalf of their special concerns?

Finally, the Politburo's stance, again until a very recent date, contributed to making any aversion toward the regime of the Soviet Union a familiar archaism comparable to a maintained reluctance to buy a Volkswagen, reducing the perspective that Moscow may come to dominate Western Europe to the fear that Bonn may become preponderant in its Western part. As *Pravda* recalls in the late spring of 1973, “the bankruptcy of frantic anti-Communism is a symptomatic event of our days.”⁸³ No wonder *Kommunist* rejects “the frequent proposals of those who want to castrate the political meaning of the peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems, replacing it by ‘purely’ economic, scientific, cultural information and tourist aspects.”⁸⁴ The essence is the weakening of anti-Communism. “Stable economic ties,” thus runs a standard theme expressed by the Soviet top level itself, “are exceedingly important . . . from the point of view of creating favorable conditions for the solution of . . . international problems.”⁸⁵ Decoded: “the recent extension in commercial

82. “U.S. Trade Prospects with the PRC,” Department of State, December 1972; emphasis added.

83. Y. Glukhov and P. Demchenko, *Pravda*, June 7, 1973.

84. Gantman, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

85. Kosygin to the Supreme Soviet, November 24, 1971; FBIS, November 26, 1971, p. 14.

and economic ties between socialist and capitalist countries in Europe has acted like a torpedo on 'Cold War' policies"⁸⁶—the latter term, of course, being Moscow's designation for all policies noticeably deviating from those proposed by itself.

During what may be privately viewed as a second NEP, it is appropriate (I have already given examples) to quote from the first. "What is at the bottom of our improved international position," the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs said in early 1924, "is ... especially our improved economic ties with all countries."⁸⁷

While we may see behind the Politburo's changed stance "the Administration's patient efforts to bring ... the Soviet Union ... into closer contact with the ... world,"⁸⁸ the Politburo may have a lower estimate of the influence that we exert on it. Indeed, it may, with whatever degree of lucidity, be aware of having progressed in insight and proficiency on the matter of how to handle *us*.

We Are Just Another European Country

Talking to Germans about economic relations between the Soviet Union and the FRG, Moscow Radio may observe, recalling the bad fifties and the still unsatisfactory sixties, that "the trade volume between *the two most important European industrial states* could not be compared with. . . ."⁸⁹ *International Affairs* reports the signing of contracts under which "France is to participate in building *Europe's biggest automobile works* at Naberezhniye Chelny. . . ."⁹⁰ "*The great European powers*, be they socialist or capitalist . . .," says a prominent intellectual.⁹¹ Of course, "the consultations . . . in Helsinki [are] between *32 European states*, the United States and Canada."⁹²

It is in such passing fashion, when speaking in some detail about, for instance, economic connections between the Soviet Union and Western Europe that the Politburo attempts to have the idea sink in that the Soviet Union is as European as Belgium. Having started as

86. Vetrov and Kazakevich, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

87. Quoted by I. Kovan, *Foreign Trade*, No. 4 (1973), p. 3.

88. James Reston, *The New York Times*, June 22, 1973.

89. Moscow Radio, May 18, 1973; FBIS, May 21, 1973, p. F24; emphasis added.

90. L. Pronyakova and V. Yermakov, December 1972, p. 110; emphasis added.

91. N. Inozemtsev, *Europe 1980*, p. 123; emphasis added.

92. Y. Nikolayev, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 5 (1973); FBIS, May 24, 1973, p. C6; emphasis added.

"one-sixth of the world" related to Communists everywhere in the other five, the Soviet Union has come home to "*our continent*"; which, agreeably, "accounts for one-fifth of the world's population, 47 percent of national income . . . 55 percent of the industrial output on our planet . . . [and] almost half of the world's scientists and researchers."⁹³ What I have illustrated is a more effective way of rejoining Europe than emphatic assurances that the socialist states have "the interest of all European nations at heart,"⁹⁴ or the call for "a new Europe—a Europe of trust and cooperation."⁹⁵ Of course, here as elsewhere, the theme as such is far from new; but the modes of conveying it, together with the changes in actual relations, seemed—at least until the summer of 1973—to give an old approach greater impact.

Demands for the "economic integration of East and West Europe"⁹⁶ are now elaborated with a specificity that used to be reserved for East Europe alone. There are "at the present time," a Soviet analyst explains, "in the West as well as in the East of Europe some national industrial complexes which comprise, if not all, then a considerable fraction of the branches of contemporary industry." This has "evident negative consequences" such as "the presence of many . . . duplicating and relatively small-scale productions and enterprises in the various countries"; a "structure" which in its turn is "a consequence of enduring political tension," and hence is now obsolete. In contrast, "Europe's economy might have a considerably more unified character"; it could in fact be "based on the complementary structure of the economies of her various states." Specifically, "socialist and capitalist countries might develop particular branches and productions," which would be "calculated to satisfy each others' needs during a long period."⁹⁷

The complement to pan-European specialization is "all-European projects," which Moscow has been proposing for some time: "The creation of a single energy system," "the construction of a European network of pipelines," "the development of various forms of communication,"⁹⁸ "the organization of transcontinental freight carriage," "the . . . utilization of sea and ocean resources"⁹⁹—standard points.

93. Pronyakova and Yermakov, *loc. cit.*; emphasis added.

94. *Ibid.*

95. N. Shmelev, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 1 (January 1973), p. 15.

96. Inozemtsev, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

97. Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

98. *Ibid.*

99. B. Pichugin, *International Affairs*, February 1972, p. 14.

It is in comparison with pan-Europe that the separateness of Western Europe is presented as disadvantageous. It would not be optimal to isolate that "subregion"¹⁰⁰ from Eastern Europe, nor to "reinforce the economic dissociation between socialist and capitalist countries" in Europe—which is, however, what "the policy of the Common Market is objectively"¹⁰¹ directed toward.

Only rarely and lightly, in keeping with the stance of having almost no enemies, will it be noted that "pan-European cooperation . . . would permit, among other things, to liquidate the retardation [sic] of Western Europe with regard to the United States of America."¹⁰² And I have seen no recent call for the reduction of our influence in pan-Europe: the less pressed, the better achieved.

Further Comments on the Westernization of Bolsheviks

Throughout my discussion of the Politburo's responses to the new economic togetherness, I have suggested how its current stance is related to changes in beliefs about the world and about ways to get ahead (as well as to protect oneself) in it. My emphasis has fallen on how much better operators the men in the Kremlin have become, at least with regard to the West—seeing us more as we really are, at the expense of previous beliefs. These beliefs, while not always explicitly stressed components of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, were always obscurely and strongly connected with it. So the increase in realism of the Politburo is likely to be one aspect of a process, of which another is a reduction in faith—hence, in drive. Which will be the larger, the increase in productivity or the decrease in energy—in 1973, 1978 . . .? The considerable unused potential for productivity in the Politburo, say as of 1958, will, I would surmise, soon have been fully put to use; while the reduction in energy from the underlying loss of faith may have proceeded slowly and may continue to do so for a long time. Were all this the case, the Politburo may be more redoubtable in 1978 than in 1988, while I would judge it to be a stronger adversary (keeping resources constant) now than it was in 1968.

Much in Soviet views and style, of course, remains unchanged: from the insistence that the West, so far as it is disposed to extend its economic-technological relations with the East, is "forced" to do so by its own difficulties and failures, to the inability to yield pride of

100. Inozemtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–128.

101. Now the mildest reproach. Shmelev, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

place. What "people will long remember" is "the labor exploits of the *Soviet and Egyptian* workers who built..."; "Aswan is ... [a] victory of two people—the *Soviet and the Egyptian*." ¹⁰³

But there is an enhanced capacity to refer to an unfavorable past without stressing the West's responsibility for it. West Berlin thus becomes just one of those "problems that have several times been the source of dangerous crises and conflicts." ¹⁰⁴ There is also an increased disposition to proclaim limited aims—e.g., mere "limitations on the arms race." ¹⁰⁵ When "the cause of disarmament" is put forward, it is at least preceded by "the cause of limiting the arms race," ¹⁰⁶ thus giving high dignity to a circumscribed objective.

Where "class interests" once reigned alone, several aspects of soul and mind may now also be considered. Some of "the causes arousing tension in Soviet-American relations" now appear as "not at all of objective character." For "a significant influence on international relations is exercised by the forces of prejudice, lack of culture and understanding." ¹⁰⁷ To be sure, these forces are located entirely in the United States; yet it is novel that they are recognized as non-negligible aspects of life.

One may go farther and acknowledge in oneself, as in the rest of mankind, the operation of an identical factor. For one Soviet intellectual this may still be the distinctive defect of the other, as when one discerns that "the desire [of foreign businessmen] to insist on control [of enterprises in the Soviet Union] as the only way to ensure ... profits looks ... like an *inertia* of thinking [as the Soviet government is willing to guarantee profits while refusing control]." ¹⁰⁸ But, for a colleague of his, the traditional Russian theme of "inertia" is not limited to foreigners: "not always," he discovers, "can we [men given to thinking] ... fully appreciate ... the importance [of this or another event]—*our human nature, the power of inertia* ... account for that." ¹⁰⁹

Apart from interests, the means created to serve them may become powerful in their own right: "the arms race itself," rather than con-

103. *Foreign Trade*, January 1972, p. 5; emphasis added.

104. G. A. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, November 1971; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 18, 1972, p. 2.

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

107. G. A. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, February 1972, p. 29.

108. I. Ivanov at the Conference sponsored by Stanford Research Institute and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, April 1973 (mimeographed), p. 15; emphasis added.

109. N. Inozemtsev, *Europe 1980*, p. 2; emphasis added.

licts of interest within "imperialism" and between it and socialism, "has become one of the most dangerous . . . threats of war."¹¹⁰ So far from "classes" always being masters of their instruments, the latter may escape from the hands of their users. "Even if they [states] do not deliberately want a world thermonuclear war," their "conflicts . . . may get out of control and make a war unavoidable."¹¹¹ More generally, "the difficulties in Soviet-American relations . . . derive . . . in part from factors which are far from always controlled by the policies of both governments."¹¹²

Rather than the state being the "executive committee of the exploiting class," numerous influences now are perceived as impinging on it. "Lenin," it is discovered, "urged a careful study of the arrangement of forces in the U.S. domestic political arena," "a differential assessment of the various political groupings." He, in fact, "stressed the need to reckon with the different shades in the approach by . . . U.S. public circles to . . . Soviet-American relations."¹¹³

If such a "shade" does not express itself in U.S. Government decisions immediately, it may still do so later. When soon after the coming into existence of Soviet power "sober-minded politicians, business and public figures" began advocating "cooperation with Soviet Russia," it is true that "at the time these voices did not carry very far," that they "did not yet have enough sway crucially to influence . . . U.S. foreign policy." But for all that "it would be wrong" —perhaps a mistake committed by the Politburo in the past—"to discount their impact on U.S. public opinion."¹¹⁴

While groups whose impact formerly might have been underestimated, because they were not counted among the "ruling class," are now taken more seriously, it is henceforth also recognized that membership in that "class" does not guarantee instant influence. When the U.S. Government at the end of 1971 changed "certain elements" of its economic policies toward the Soviet Union, "the discussion of these questions in the press and at conferences . . . once more demonstrated how considerable was the rift . . . between the moods of business circles [presumably desiring farther-reaching changes] and the country's . . . trade policy." At this point, perhaps afraid of his audacity, the author assumes the cost of a non sequitur for the benefit

110. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, November 1971; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 18, 1972, p. 2.

111. *Ibid.*

112. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, February 1972, p. 29.

113. B. Svetlov, *International Affairs*, February 1972, p. 16.

114. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-16.

of ending with orthodoxy: "... [this] showed the pressure which business circles can nowadays bring to bear on the government." ¹¹⁵

The asserted conflict between capitalism and socialism ceases to dominate each and every aspect of the world. "The difficulty of the problems dividing the two sides," it may now be said about the Soviet Union and the United States, "even apart from ideological differences. ..." That this manner of reference is a singular advance is indicated by a rapid withdrawal: "The difficulty of Soviet-American relations is to a considerable degree explained by the fact that they represent two opposed social systems." ¹¹⁶ But the retreat is only partial: "to a considerable degree" is considerably less than the orthodox adverbial "totally," which was so taken for granted in the past that it would typically not be uttered, but rather contained, in such a sentence, in the word "explained."

The Bolshevik restriction upon the word "revolution" as referring only to the socio-political domain is abolished: Brezhnev and Kosygin render mandatory the locution "the contemporary scientific and technological revolution." That word "revolution" may even become the only current one: "by combining the advantages of *socialism* with the achievements of *the scientific and technical revolution*." ¹¹⁷

"Forces of production"—depending on science—gain in weight over "class relations." As to promises to provide the American people with guns and butter simultaneously, "even such a *rich country* as the U.S.A. has proved unable to accomplish this task." ¹¹⁸ When it is pointed out that "only 7 percent" of American gross national product is absorbed by military expenditures, "account should be taken of the fact that *the fraction of the national product remaining after expenditures of absolute necessity*—and hence available for improvements, reforms, social needs—is not that large." ¹¹⁹ "Of course," one may now begin, "technical questions are not of decisive significance," and then continue: "but much is often determined by them." ¹²⁰

Questions regarding all of mankind—where, earlier, capitalism would have been affirmed to be contrary to the interests of humanity and socialism to be consonant with them—may now make for possibly

115. S. Shvernev, *S.Sh.A.*, April 1972; FBIS, May 3, 1972, p. G7.

116. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, February 1972, p. 27.

117. N. A. Berdinnikov, *S.Sh.A.*, November 1972; JPRS 57659, p. 5; emphasis added.

118. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, November 1971; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, January 18, 1972, p. 3; emphasis added.

119. Arbatov, *S.Sh.A.*, February 1972, p. 28; emphasis added.

120. Shvernev, *op. cit.*, p. G11.

harmonious cooperation between the two social systems. Thus, the conclusion of the Soviet-American agreement on the protection of the environment is, according to one Soviet analyst, "the first step on the path of combining the resources of various countries for the solution of a problem concerning all mankind."¹²¹ So the profit motive no longer seems to pollute by an order of magnitude more than the humanistic motives of socialism. (Imagine what would have been said about the radical differences between "capitalism" and "socialism," had ecology been prominent in 1948.)

Wanting to be nice when meeting with representatives of the "other social system," Soviet representatives have begun to use their interlocutors' word "market economy" instead of their own, "capitalism"¹²²—a concession requiring the violation of one's own sacred (or what used to be that) vocabulary. For Marxists learn in Party grade school that there are two kinds of market economies: the "simple production of commodities," where producers own their means of production, and "capitalism," where they do not. Calling capitalism a "market economy" would thus, until the present, have been an act of hiding its obnoxious essence.

For Marxists, whose panacea is the abolition of private *property* in the means of production so as to abolish *profit*, the two are indissoluble. In this respect foreign concessions in the twenties were easy, granting both.¹²³ As of the present, Moscow is sticky on foreign property while forthcoming on profits; and now its spokesmen seem to feel no difficulty in separating what Marx had joined. True enough, one may begin, "setting up . . . enclaves of foreign property within the socialist economy is not allowed." But so what? "What is the . . . goal for an American businessman, *ownership* or *profits*? The latter, I suppose." Now, if profits "(at an . . . agreed rate) could be . . . *guaranteed* to him . . . to reinvest or to transfer abroad, what would be his reasons to be interested in . . . control?"¹²⁴

Enumerating Brezhnev's foreign trips in 1971, one may begin with Yugoslavia, proceed to two people's democracies (Hungary, Bulgaria), continue with a capitalist country (France), then mention another people's democracy (the German Democratic Republic). For Kosygin,

121. N. Shmelev, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 1 (1973), p. 15.

122. E.g., Ivanov, at the SRI/IWEIR Conference, p. 4.

123. For the Politburo's inclination to resume that arrangement, see statements made by Deputy Foreign Trade Minister V. S. Alkhimov according to Victor Zorza, *Chicago Sun Times*, April 5, 1973; and G. Bazhenov, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 3 (1973), pp. 94-95.

124. Ivanov, at the SRI/IWEIR Conference, p. 14; emphasis in the original.

one may start with a "progressive" country (Algeria), continue with one that is not (Morocco), then follow with a capitalist one (Canada), a socialist one (Cuba), and two more capitalist areas (Denmark, Norway).¹²⁵ But then "the strengthening of the unity . . . of the socialist countries" has become merely "an important section" of "our international activities."¹²⁶ And the entire Soviet Union may be seen as one big firm in a competitive market comprising the world: "The [24th Party] Congress pointed out the need . . . to raise the effectiveness of the U.S.S.R.'s participation in the international division of labor . . . so as to react quickly to the requirements and possibilities of the world market."¹²⁷

One may now admit (or discover) similarities between the "two social systems" which could not be avowed or recognized before. "The diversity of . . . [countries'] attitudes within the same system [capitalist or socialist]," a prominent Soviet intellectual observes, "is sometimes very marked." He even goes on to mention names: "In the East as well as in the West of Europe there are countries which, while developing close political and economic relations with states possessing a similar¹²⁸ socio-political structure, nevertheless do not adhere to the military alliances to which their partners belong." To wit: "among the socialist states this is the case for Yugoslavia; among the capitalist countries, one may cite Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Austria."¹²⁹ Why is it worthwhile, the reader may ask, to cite this Soviet mention of the evident? Because, I submit, Soviet spokesmen, dedicated in the past to the sense and the proclamation of a total difference between *them* and *us*, avoided wherever feasible (and it would have been easy here) any explicit acknowledgment of similarities. That the limits to the present permissiveness are not too wide becomes evident when the same Soviet analyst turns to the matter of "national security interests"—again accepting Western (American) lingo. Brezhnev informs American newsmen that his government refuses emigration to people connected with "what *today* is called national security"¹³⁰—and points out that such interests frequently lead to "important divergences" between states on "questions of reducing armed forces, limiting and prohibiting certain types of armament." But apparently this is the case *only* "among certain states of Western Europe."¹³¹

125. *Foreign Trade*, January 1972, p. 3.

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

128. Shocking—one would have expected "the same." There are only two.

129. Inozemtsev, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–124.

130. June 14, 1973; *The New York Times*, June 15, 1973; emphasis added.

131. *Ibid.*

When *similarities between* systems become speakable or visible, the same may happen to *differences within* each of them. Expressing a view on a crucial matter which has not already been stated in quite the same form by higher levels, a Soviet intellectual in contact with the West may now pretend (à la Victor Louis) or disclose—I would still presume the former—that he is “speaking . . . in a personal capacity and [sic] with a personal opinion.”¹³² Finally, one may even begin admitting disagreements within one’s own domain. When a journalist of *Der Spiegel* asks Dzhermen Gvishiani, the most prominent and best connected young intellectual specializing in contacts with the West, whether “there are not people [in the Soviet establishment] who fear that if the Soviet Union participates in the international division of labor, it will become dependent on the world abroad,” the reply is a proper one: “There is nobody among us who sees it this way.” But, propriety satisfied, the new realism breaks through, though in Western high-brow language, where one talks about intellectual processes rather than about what these might allow one to observe: “A few perhaps approach this problem on different levels. . . .” Worse, such disagreements may have economic bases, making the homogeneity of socialism disappear: “on different levels, perhaps for some economic reasons.” Having ventured so far, the innovator annuls what he has done by noting that the events to which he has admitted have no impact: “But there are no political obstacles in this domain in our country!”¹³³

*Postscript: What They Might Think of What We Say:
Imagined Views of a Soviet Discussant*¹³⁴

As students of bureaucratic decisionmaking have impressed upon us for the past decade, governments are not unitary decisionmakers. If my hypothetical Soviet discussant, “representing” the ruling group in Moscow, and his opposite number in the West were taken literally in the paragraphs that follow, we would have passed beyond conjecture into myth (perhaps more with regard to the United States than to the Soviet Union). My excuse is, of course, first approximation. I

132. Ivanov, dissociating property and profit at the SRI/IWEIR Conference, p. 14. Both the flimsiness of the pretense and the magnitude of the change require repetition.

133. *Der Spiegel*, 1972, No. 19, p. 73.

134. Beginning at the top of p. 283, the operative pronoun referents are as follows:

We, our, us	the Soviet Union
You, your	the United States

fancy that a majority in the Politburo might be found for a majority of the reactions I imagine.

Sometimes we agree with a point you make, but not with the consequence you draw from it.

- As our stakes in politically vulnerable economic transactions increase, we have an added incentive to avoid unpleasantness among us. But if and when important opportunities for advancement open up for us, we shall continue to prevent ourselves from degenerating—with the help of your constantly telling us that we are bound to—and shall therefore be prepared to assume the costs and risks of another bout of forward policy. All the more, as by then the Second NEP on which we are now starting may have run much of its course. (You—with respect to whom we have performed so many left and right turns—don't really believe our policies to be eternal, or to last for 40 years, just because we've said, or even contracted, so. Or do you?) Furthermore, your aid will have enlarged our resource base.
- We are like each other in many ways. Sure, we have always striven to emulate your efficiency; Stalin proclaimed it to be one of the two basic components of our style in 1924. The other component is "revolutionary sweep," which we are pleased you are so certain we have lost. So it doesn't follow that things between ourselves should be cozy in the long run just because in the style of day-to-day dealings we have more in common than with, say, older types in British and French ruling circles (the newer ones imitate you, in any case).

Also, we don't see why you should be so pleased about our having *efficiency* in common. Although it may then be more fun to deal with each other, we are sufficiently oriented on outcomes to be gratified when we find you unlike ourselves, less efficient (for all your pride in efficiency), blind—as in not perceiving the limits of our likeness. While the pleasure of the game is perhaps then reduced (not necessarily—there is joy in deception too), our chances of winning it are increased. Despite what we are both increasingly proclaiming, we at least are old-fashioned enough to continue believing that our game remains largely—what do you call it?—zero sum.¹³⁵

There are things you strive for (or say you do) which we take for granted, and from which, once again, you expect effects that we would not predict.

135. This may indeed be old-fashioned in a world with not only nuclear weapons but also multipolarity (N.L.).

- You advocate contacts for the sake of mutual respect. But that already exists—and it goes perfectly well with our belief that it will ultimately be you or ourselves.
- We foresee much less clearly than some of you that either you or we will “lose control” in a crisis; should this happen, we do not believe that enlarging our non-critical relations at that point would have much effect.

Some means that you envision using for objectives we might not share would, in any case, be too weak to attain them.

- You imagine dampening conflict by enlarging on concurrent non-conflict—as if proper statesmen would allow themselves to be influenced by a spillover of feelings (what we call spontaneity), as if they were not capable of pursuing both high conflict and high collaboration at the same time.

There are means that you propose ostensibly for an end acceptable to us, but that we would suspect—because of your insistence on their benign employment—of serving a hostile purpose.

- Such as when you advocate enlarging upon non-conflict relations in a crisis, so as to convince us of your lack of aggressive designs—or perhaps to blind us to them?

Some among you announce that you are attempting to do things to us which we refuse and shall prevent from being imposed on us. These things we don't attempt to do to you, either because we don't want to or because we know we can't.

- Some among you want to come close to us so as to make us like you.
- And thus to make us resemble you.
- As well as to convert us.

There are other things announced by you in the same vein which we shall also prevent you from doing to us. These we would love to do to *you*, but we don't presume to be able to. They include:

- Making the other side more predisposed through personal contacts to keep and amplify contracts.
- Achieving wide and deep penetrations without explicit agreement by the other side.

According to you, certain symmetries are best for both of us. In our belief, certain asymmetries are feasible, being useful for us and harmful to you; these we strive to obtain and maintain.

- While according to you it is best for both of us to understand each other fully, we consider it most useful for us—as it has already proved (say, in 1942–1946)—that you be blind (with our help) about aspects in which we are unlike you. Hence, your statements about “the same human qualities” are just fine.

- The same goes for our liking each other (of course, we and you are only talking about feelings that infect conduct). We, however, have learned to provoke and sustain your liking us, without losing our ability to reciprocate (in the service of our ultimate goal).

You talk much about what you are little capable of doing to us—penetrating us—while we say little about what we can and do achieve to a greater extent—overtly entering into all kinds of sectors and structures within you. Your capacity is mildly degraded by your garbularity (our countermeasures would operate even if you talked less); ours is substantially enhanced by our silence (reducing your awareness of our strategy).

You continue to enunciate certain objectives without even deigning to mention that we refuse them:

- Such as when you propose changes in the organization for our foreign economic relations, while we have consistently declared our structures in this regard to be unchangeable.

You are in the habit of announcing that you are going to produce certain impacts on us which you should know to be unacceptable to us in content and in form (we don't like being influenced and, to boot, being told that we are going to be)—as if you were the masters of overwhelming forces about which we can do nothing. While we would in any case do much, the public nature of your stance reminds us (and for this we are obliged to you) to go to the limit in counteracting your designs:

- Your plan to make us increase, beyond our own intent, the fraction of GNP allotted to consumer goods.
- Your objective of rendering us attached in soul, rather than merely expediently conforming in conduct, to existing rules of international economic relations.
- Your device of having the structure of our economy converge with that of yours through the effects of a greater orientation of ours on exports as well as through the acceleration of growth, which we intend to achieve by utilizing you.
- Your intention of making us lose faith in our economic order through the importance to us of your economic aid.
- And of achieving the same effect through more education accompanying more growth, again owing to you.
- As well as through higher consumption levels.
- And through reduction in the material differences between life with you and with us.

However, we continue to believe that Bolsheviks can utilize whatever they choose, even Pepsi, without becoming the appendage of its source.